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Shawn Boyne*
I. OVERVIEW
One of the most controversial provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (TPP) is the provision that requires the treaty signatories to impose
criminal sanctions for copyright infringement even in cases where the of-
fender is not motivated by commercial gain.1 This focus is a notable shift, as
at the dawn of the digital age, state prosecutors in many countries typically
targeted only commercial pirates who profited by copying and distributing
thousands of copies.2 But, given that the United States has led the way in
imposing harsher penalties on copyright pirates, it is not surprising to see the
increasing criminalization of copyright infringement appear in the TPP.
To date however, the effort by the United States to create a comprehen-
sive international copyright regime has not significantly dented the ubiquity
of copyright piracy. If we look at software piracy alone, the ballpark esti-
mates of piracy rates and the concomitant loss of commercial value are stag-
gering.3 The four regions of the world with the highest software piracy rates
include: Central and Eastern Europe (62%); Latin America (61%); Asia Pa-
cific (60%); and the Middle East and Africa (58%).4 Although the TPP’s
criminal law provisions are intended to reduce those rates of piracy, it is not
yet apparent whether the TPP will impact Vietnam’s penal code or merely
spur an increase in the costs of investigation, prosecution, and punishment.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
When the full-text of the TPP was published in February 2016, com-
mentators from the copyright community both criticized and applauded
Chapter 18’s strong protections of intellectual property rights.5 From the per-
spective of the United States Trade Representative, the provision for criminal
* Professor, Indiana University McKinney School of Law.
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3. Andrew D. Getsinger, A New Approach to Combating the Piracy of Intellectual
Property: Develop the Rule of Law and Increase the Supply of Legitimate
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penalties protections represents a decisive step towards strengthening IP pro-
tections internationally.6 From an American perspective, the need to protect
our motion picture, electronic game, and computer software industries has
been a key driver behind the effort to internationalize the imposition of crim-
inal penalties for copyright violations.
Even though several of the key industries that benefit from copyright
protections are relatively new industries, the criminalization of copyright in-
fringement in the United States dates back to the 19th century.7 The United
States first enacted criminal copyright legislation in 1897.8 But, it is only
within the past twenty-five years that Congress has dramatically expanded
the reach of this criminalization effort and stiffened the potential criminal
penalties. Although the early legislation targeted those who profited commer-
cially by violating copyright protections, today prosecutors even pursue those
who make copies for personal use or freely share copies of documents or
files.9
This effort towards the increasing criminalization of copyright protec-
tions has intensified as digital technology has made it both easy and cheap to
reproduce and distribute “stolen” works. As the costs of reproduction have
fallen, Congress has sought to increase the penalties that can be imposed in
copyright breach cases. Though Congress first introduced felony level penal-
ties for breaches only in 1982, today American courts may impose sentences
between one to ten years on copyright pirates as well as fines of up to a
million dollars depending on the gravity of the offense and whether the indi-
vidual is a repeat offender.10
Supporters of the criminal sanctions provision argue that civil sanctions
and self-help remedies used in the domestic legal regimes of many countries
have proven either to be too costly or unsuccessful.11 As a result, supporters
maintain that criminal sanctions are needed to deter copyright theft.12 Critics
of the agreement allege that these provisions advance the agenda of the en-
tertainment and pharmaceutical industries at the expense of Internet users
and innovators.13
6. Id.
7. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U.L. REV. 731, 735–36
(2003).
8. Id.
9. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 350.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
11. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration:
An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 275, 294 (2014).
12. Id. at 277.
13. See Malcolm, supra note 1.
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From a defense perspective, the effort to protect copyrighted works us-
ing the criminal law crossed a key line with the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.14 In hindsight, the weakening of the intent standard needed to secure a
criminal conviction may have presaged the low mens rea standard in the
TPP’s Section 18.77.15 In particular, the possibility of convicting someone of
a criminal copyright charge even if the infringement was not motivated by
commercial purpose or financial gain has troubled critics of the provision.16
The indictment of Aaron Schwartz on charges that he illegally downloaded
and distributed articles from an academic journal, and his subsequent suicide,
prompted privacy rights advocates to condemn the government’s targeting of
individuals not motivated by financial gain.17
The United States is not alone in imposing substantial penalties for cop-
yright infringement. In the United Kingdom, individuals convicted in the
low-level magistrate courts face a potential maximum term of incarceration
of 6 months, a fine of up to £50,000, or both.18 However, offenders convicted
in the United Kingdom’s Crown Court may face a ten-year maximum term.19
In comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom, France has
taken a more lenient approach to criminalizing copyright violations as the
maximum criminal sanction for infringement is three years imprisonment and
a corresponding fine.20
III. IMPACT OF SECTION 18.77 ON VIETNAM
It is important to recognize that beginning in 2005, Vietnam began to
adopt extensive intellectual property laws and regulations as part of its partic-
ipation in the World Trade Organization and specifically, its participation in
the “TRIPS” agreement.21 But, despite those protections, few copyright hold-
14. Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 11, at 293 n.104.
15. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, LAW OFFS. OF STEWART & STEWART, http://
www.stewartlaw.com/Content/Documents/TPP%20Side%20by%20Side%v20
Chapter%2018.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
16. Id.
17. Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream, NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11/requiem-for-a-dream.
18. Copyright Designs and Patent Act 1988, c. 48, § 107 (Eng.), http://www.legis-
lation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/part/I/chapter/VI/crossheading/offences.
19. Id.; The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, sch. 4,
part 1, ¶ 17(Eng.).
20. CODE LA PROPRI ´ET ´E INTELLECTUELLE [Intellectual Property Code] art. L615-14
(Fr.).
21. VIETNAM CIVIL CODE, No. 33/2005/QH11, Part Six (2006) (Viet.); IRP Toolkit,
U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATE IN VIETNAM, http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/ba-
sic-page/intellectual-property (last visited Jan. 30, 2018); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
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ers attempt to enforce their rights in Vietnamese courts.22 The lack of litiga-
tion on the civil side may illustrate the likely impact of the TPP’s criminal
sanctions on copyright pirates. As one example, at a recent conference in
Vietnam, the tribunal president of the Economic Court stated that his court
settled only about twenty cases of copyright infringement annually between
2000 and 2007.23 Despite that low litigation rate, the actual rate of infringe-
ments is far higher.24 For example, in 2005 in Ho Chi Minh City, there were
at least 231 cases.25
But, it is too soon to tell how the criminalization of copyright piracy
will impact Vietnam. It is not yet clear whether Section 18.77’s requirement
that signatories impose criminal penalties in cases of willful copyright or
related rights on a commercial scale will require Vietnam to alter its current
penal code provisions. With the implementation of the Vietnamese Penal
Code of 2015, Vietnam began treating copyright infringement as a crime.26
Given the absence of copyright litigation in Vietnam’s civil courts, one
might question whether Section 18.77 of the TPP will impact the detection
and prosecution of copyright piracy. Assuming that the country prioritizes
criminal enforcement, implementing a stiffer domestic enforcement regime
will impose enforcement costs. In essence, the criminalization of copyright
protections imposes both a responsibility and a burden on the government to
protect the rights of private copyright holders, who previously bore the bur-
den of bringing enforcement actions. Beyond the costs to the government, the
increased enforcement of copyright regulations will raise the cost of doing
business among those small to medium sized enterprises, which rely heavily
on pirated software. These industries will bear the brunt of the costs of stiff-
ening intellectual property regimes in the short-run.
IV. CRITIQUE
The main purpose of criminal law is to protect society by facilitating the
detection and prosecution of criminal acts. From an economic perspective, it
makes sense to use criminal penalties in an attempt to deter individuals or
organizations who violate copyright protections on a large scale but are es-
sentially judgment proof. From the perspective of social harm, a case may
also be made for imposing criminal sanctions on individuals who work for
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
22. Copyright Theft Plagues Vietnam’s Software Producers, SUNRISE INTELLEC-
TUAL PROP. LAW FIRM, http://sunriseip.com/english/indexen.php?mod=ipnews




26. VIETNAM PENAL CODE, No. 15/199/QH10, art. 131 (2015) (Viet.).
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large-scale operations that illegally copy and sell bootlegged movies, music,
and software. However, by giving governments the power to criminalize all
“willful” copyright infringement, Section 18.77 risks allowing governments
to targeting casual file sharers rather than the enterprises that engage in the
most socially harmful conduct.27 Taken to the worst extreme, critics fear that
states will disproportionally prosecute the low hanging fruit, namely poor
offenders.28 To this end, Section 18.77 contains no provisions that will ensure
that governments will target large-scale counterfeiting operations.29 Also, the
provision’s weak mens rea requirement allows governments to impose crimi-
nal liability, not only on individuals who do not profit economically from an
alleged infringement, but also on individuals who acted in good faith.30
Before imposing criminal liability on an individual, state prosecutors should
be required to show that the suspect knew that the infringed works were
protected by copyright and that he knew that his conduct was unlawful.31
Such a requirement would help distinguish harmful from valuable conduct
such as non-commercial file sharing.
27. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.77.
28. See Jeremy Malcolm, The Final Leaked TPP Text is All That We Feared, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/final-
leaked-tpp-text-all-we-feared.
29. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 18.77.
30. See id.
31. Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 11, at 316.
